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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant the Dennis B. Fitzpatrick and Tracy L. Fitzpatrick Revocable Trust, through

its

Trustees, Dennis Fitzpatrick and Tracy Fitzpatrick (“Fitzpatricks”) ﬁrst reiterate and repeat their

Statement of the Case in their Appellant’s Brief

at

pages 1-13 as

if fully set forth herein.

Furthermore, Respondent/Cross-Appellants Alan and Sherry Kent, as husband and Wife, and as
Trustees of

their

The Alan and Sherry Kent Living Trust Dated 11/07/2003, (“Kents”) did not submit

own Nature 0f Case, Course ofProceedings, 0r Concise Statement 0f Facts, but rather adopted

the Fitzpatricks’ Statement of the Case With limited exception. Thus, the Fitzpatricks simply refer

back

to their Appellant’s Brief unless otherwise set out herein.

II.

1.

ISSUE PRESENTED

ON APPEAL

District Court err in denying Appellant’s Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment, while granting Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
ﬁnding the easement void as a matter 0f law?

Did the

III.

1.

Did the

2.

Have

ISSUES PRESENTED

ON CROSS-APPEAL

Kents were not entitled t0 attorneys’
fees pursuant t0 Idaho Code Section 12-121?
District Court err in ruling that the

on appeal, speciﬁcally
Supreme Court case 0f Murr v. Wisconsin, and the
Easement Agreement?

the Fitzpatricks raised issues for the ﬁrst time

equitable estoppel, the U.S.

scope 0f the
3.

Are the Kents

entitled t0 attorneys” fees

0n appeal?

APPELLANT — CROSS RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF, Page
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IV.

A

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL

court’s determination as t0 Whether an action

district

was brought or defended

frivolously Will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Thornton

301, 315, 385 P.3d 856, 870 (2016); Idaho Military Historical Soc

When

624, 629, 329 P.3d 1072, 1077 (2014).

(2)

Inc.

an exercise of discretion

court conducts a three-step inquiry: (1) Whether the

0f discretion;

’y,

trial

v.

is

Pandrea, 161 Idaho
Maslen, 156 Idaho

v.

involved, the appellate

court properly perceived the issue as one

whether that court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and

consistently with any legal standards applicable t0 speciﬁc choices; and (3) Whether the court

reached

its

decision

by

the exercise of reason.

Sun Valley Shopping Center

v.

Idaho Power C0.,

119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).

V.

The

District

Court erred When

it

granted the Kents’ Motion for

denied the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion for
valid express easement over Lot 4; (2)

ARGUMENT

Summary Judgment because

the

Summary Judgment and

(1) the Fitzpatricks

Easement Agreement created a

restrictive

have a

covenant

over Lot 4; (3) the Kents are estopped from extinguishing the equitable servitude against Lot 4;
(4)

merger 0f

title

did not occur between Lots 3 and 4; (5) the Kents had record notice of the

recorded easement and are not bona ﬁde purchasers for value; (6) the Fitzpatricks have a right and
a duty to maintain the

Pond Easement;

(7) the

Kents took Lot 4 subject t0 the encumbrances,

preventing them from interfering with or obstructing the Fitzpatricks’ use of the Pond Easement;

and (8) the Kents’ Motion for Summary Judgment and opposition t0 the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion
for

Summary Judgment

fail for

lack 0f afﬁrmative facts in support of their motion and lack of any

genuine issues of material fact opposing the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion.
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Conversely, the District Court did not err
fees pursuant t0 Idaho

Code Section 12-121, and

when

declined t0 award the Kents attorneys’

Court should not award attorney fees t0 the

this

Kents 0n appeal. This Court should, however, address
as set forth herein because these issues

it

all

issues set forth in Appellant’s Brief and

were properly raised by the Fitzpatricks before the

District

Court.

A. The Fitzpatricks’ Replv to Issues 0n Appeal
In Respondents’ and Cross—Appellants’ Brief, the Kents argue that the Fitzpatricks’ appeal

“belies the

narrow issue on appeal.” (Resp.

B12, p. 2).

The Kents then quote a judge

in the

States Court 0f Appeals for the 3rd Circuit for the proposition that if an appellant brings

issues

in

0n appeal, the appeal, including every individual

law or

point,

up multiple

N0 basis

merit. Id.

fact exists supporting this proposition.

In this case, the Fitzpatricks have only one issue

denying Appellant’s Cross Motion for
for

must be without

United

Summary Judgment, ﬁnding

on appeal: Did the

Summary Judgment, while

District Court err in

granting Respondent’s Motion

the easement void as a matter of law?

Fitzpatricks divided their Appellant’s Brief into

render their entire appeal without merit.

To

numbered

The

fact that the

sections one through eight does not

the contrary, the Fitzpatricks submit that each and

every one of the issues addressed in their Appellant’s Brief has merit and should be earnestly
considered by this Court. Each of the eight issues are addressed as follows.
1.

The

The Easement
District

is

a Valid Express Easement

Court erred When

Fitzpatricks have a valid

it

denied the Fitzpatricks’ Cross Motion because the

and enforceable Pond Easement. The Kents incorrectly argue

are simply

n0 circumstances whereby a property owner can encumber

unless

through a reservation in a deed. Yes, the

it is

common law

APPELLANT — CROSS RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF, Page
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his or her

general rule

is

that there

own

that

property

one cannot

have an easement over one’s own property, and that proposition is not being challenged by the
Fitzpatricks. The nature of the Fitzpatricks’ appeal is simple, there are always exceptions to
general rules and this case falls under a few of those exceptions.
The Fitzpatricks owned two separate and distinct subdivision lots in Widgeon Lakes
Estates Subdivision (“Widgeon Lakes”) and prior to selling one of the lots, Lot 4, the Fitzpatricks
wanted to put all potential buyers on notice that they were reserving a right to use the Pond
Easement on Lot 4. The Fitzpatricks also wanted all potential buyers to know that Lot 4 would
have a restriction on its use. The Grant of Easement (the “Easement Agreement”) did just that, it
reserved a right for the owners of Lot 3 to use Lot 4, in perpetuity, to use, repair, maintain, and
improve the Pond Easement. The Easement Agreement sets forth in relevant part:
1.3
Pond Easement. The Grantor Real Property and Benefited Real Property
share a common pond and Grantee has requested the Grantor to convey to the
Grantee a nonexclusive easement on a portion of the Grantor Real Property in favor
of the Benefited Real Property for the purposes described in Section 2.2 below.
The portion of the Grantor Real Property that has been requested for the easement
is described on Exhibit C attached (the “Easement Real Property”).
…
2.2
Purpose of Easement. The Pond Easement is granted for the use, benefit,
and enjoyment of the pond, the property surrounding the pond as set forth in Exhibit
C, and also for the right to maintain, repair, and improve the Easement Real
Property.
(R., pp. 127-132). The Easement Agreement was duly recorded on September 12, 2016, as Ada
County Instrument Number 2016-085988. (R., pp. 116, 127-132). That same day, after the
Easement Agreement was recorded, the Fitzpatricks listed Lot 4 for sale on the multiple listing
service (the “MLS”). (R., pp. 116, 134). The MLS listing specifically stated, “This property has
a recorded easement on north side. New owner will be allowed view but vinyl fencing and pond
will remain attached to and maintained by adjacent property.” (R., pp. 116, 134).
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In Respondents’ and Cross Appellants’ Brief, the Kents suggest that six

before the Fitzpatricks took any action on the sale of Lot 4, Which
Fitzpatricks immediately listed the property

December

15,

is false.

months passed

(Resp. B12, p.

7).

The

upon recordation of the Easement Agreement, and by

2016, the Kents and the Fitzpatricks had entered into a RE-24 Vacant Land Real

Estate Purchase and Sale

Agreement

agent, Tracy Brault, speciﬁcally

for Lot 4 (“RE-24”).

(R., pp. 117, 136-141).

and verbally notiﬁed Alan Kent

that the

The

listing

Pond Easement was

controlled and maintained as part of the Fitzpatricks’ property, Lot 3. (R., p. 116).

The RE-24

speciﬁcally states, “Buyers are aware of a recorded easement on the north side of the property.”

(R., p. 137).

At no time did the Kents challenge

to their purchase

0f Lot

Agreement prior to
the

4,

closing.

the recordation 0f the

Easement Agreement prior

nor did they raise any objections to the validity 0f the Easement

T0

the contrary, the

Easement Agreement

is still

recorded today with

Ada County Recorder’s Ofﬁce.
Apart from citing multiple cases for the general proposition that “one cannot have an

easement

in his

own lands”

(Resp. B12, pp. 3-5) (emphasis in original), the Kents d0 not address

the merits 0f the Fitzpatricks’ argument that the

frauds,

LC.

§ 9-503, that

it

passed with

title

Easement Agreement complies With the

to the

Kents pursuant to LC.

statute

§ 55-603, and,

0f

when

construing an instrument which conveys an interest in land, effect should be given t0 the intent 0f
the parties to the transaction as held in

Daugharly

v.

Post Falls Hwy. Dist, 134 Idaho 73 1, 735, 9

P.3d 534, 538 (2000). The Kents simply deem the Easement Agreement void as a matter 0f law,
Without exception.1 The District Court erred by doing this same thing; failing t0 consider the
exceptions t0 the general rule. Because the Kents do not present an argument that the Easement

1

The Kents d0 attempt

t0

argue that because the Easement Agreement was not signed by Tracy Fitzpatrick, it should be
The Kents never raised this issue before the District Court, thus applying apples t0 apples in the

invalidated. (Resp. Br., p. 17).

Kents’ various arguments, this Court should not consider the issue because

it is

being raised for the ﬁrst time on appeal.
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Agreement

fails to

comply with

Easement Agreement

is

all

that the

valid and enforceable as a matter of law.

The Easement Created a

2.

ﬁnd

other aspects of Idaho law, this Court should

The Easement Agreement

is

Restrictive

Covenant 0n Lot 4

an express easement that also serves as a restrictive covenant

against Lot 4 preventing the owners 0f Lot 4 from obstructing 0r interfering With the rights 0f the

owners 0f Lot
argument

3.

that the

The Kents

incorrectly assert that this Court should disregard the Fitzpatricks’

Easement Agreement constituted a restrictive covenant because the Fitzpatricks

“did not plead them or assert them in their motion for
allegation

completely

is

The

Memorandum

08).

They dedicated

in Support

covenants in

of Plaintiff’ s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R., pp. 104-

restrictive

16). Finally,

it its

full

Summary Judgment.

Reply Memorandum

(R., pp. 252-54).

engaging the District Court in a dialogue 0n the

Memorandum

issue.

Decision and Order of Cross Motions for

Court simply disagreed with the legal application in

The

this case.

Fitzpatricks appear to use the terms “easement,

99

66

was
The

Fitzpatricks

Summary

(TL, Vol.

I,

pp. 13-

Summary Judgment,
raised,

however, the

District Court noted:

equitable servitude,” and

“real covenant” interchangeably in their brieﬁng. Distinguishing

among

Which 0f them best describes the Pond Easement,
necessary because the merger doctrine applies to all three.
terms, so as to determine

(R., p. 278).

in Further

argument, the Fitzpatricks argued the legal concept of

the District Court recognized that the issue 0f restrictive covenants

District

The

covenant in their Opposition t0 Defendants’ Motion for

(R., p. 184). Finally, at oral

restrictive covenants,

pages 0f brieﬁng on

restrictive

Support of Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for

Judgment.

ﬁve

three pages to restrictive covenants in their

ﬁthher recognized the

(Resp. B12, p. 14). This

false.

Fitzpatricks dedicated almost

their

summary judgment.”

those
isn’t

Accordingly, to suggest that the Fitzpatricks did not raise the issue of restrictive

covenants with the District Court

is

not only disingenuous,

it is
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ﬂatly false.

Even though

the Kents initially argue the issue of restrictive covenants should not be

addressed by this Court, the Kents eventually discuss the applicability of restrictive covenants in
this case.

The

Fitzpatricks assert that the

which prevents the owners of Lot 4 from
repair,

this

Easement Agreement includes a

restrictive

covenant

interfering with the Lot 3 owner’s use, maintenance,

and improvement of the Pond Easement. To support

Court to the Easement Agreement, Which

their position, the Fitzpatricks direct

states:

The Grantor, 0n behalf of the Grantor and

the Grantor’s heirs, successors, assigns,

purchasers, or transferee 0f any kind, covenants and agrees With the Grantee and
the Grantee’s heirs, successors, assigns, purchasers, 0r transferee 0f any kind,

M

Easement Agreement (i) shall run with and bind the Easement
Real Property, and (ii) shall inure to the beneﬁt 0f, and be enforceable (at law or in
equity) by any owner of all or part 0f, the Beneﬁted Real Property.
the provisions of this

(R., p. 127)

(emphasis added). The covenants Within the Easement Agreement are enforceable as

to all subsequent

owners 0f Lot 4, including the Kents. See West Wood Investments,

Inc.

v.

Accord,

141 Idaho 75, 106 P.3d 401 (2005).
In this case, the District Court did not

Agreement constituted a

restrictive covenant, the

The Kents are Estopped from

An enforceable

if the

merger doctrine voided the Easement

restrictive

and incorrectly argue

Merger

will

covenant over Lot

4.

Nullifving the Equitable Servitude 0n Lot 4

equitable servitude encumbers Lot 4 for the use and beneﬁt of Lot 3, thus,

the Kents cannot nullify or extinguish the equitable servitude.

2

Court held that even

as a matter 0f law? (R., p. 278). Accordingly, the Fitzpatricks submit that the District

Court erred by failing t0 recognize the validity 0f the
3.

a ﬁnding Whether 0r not the Easement

restrictive covenant, rather, the District

Easement Agreement constituted a

Agreement

make

Once

again, the Kents similarly

that the Fitzpatricks failed t0 plead or argue equitable servitudes to the

be more thoroughly addressed

later herein.
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District Court. (Resp. Br., p. 14).

To

the contrary, the Fitzpatricks raised the issue 0f equitable

servitudes multiple times throughout their pleadings, motions, and oral argument.

First,

the Fitzpatricks raised the issue of estoppel and equitable servitudes in their

Memorandum

in Support

of Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for

Summary Judgment.

(R., pp. 105-106).

Second, equitable servitudes were addressed by the Fitzpatricks in their

Plaintiff’ s

Memorandum

(R., pp. 252-54).

in Further Support

0f Cross Motions for

Speciﬁcally, the Fitzpatricks likened this case t0 the West

was held t0 be estopped from refusing t0 recognize
had actual notice 0f the same.
length as to

why the

Summary Judgment.

Wood Investments

equitable servitudes

(R., p. 254). Finally, at oral

I,

pp. 30-32).

The

whereby a party

on real property When they

argument, the Fitzpatricks argued

Kents should be estopped from denying the existence

Easement Agreement. (TL, V01.

case,

Reply

of,

and validity

District Court recognized that the

at

of, the

Kents knew

about the Easement Agreement, and in response, the Fitzpatricks argued:

which means they can’t now — thev’re essentiallv iudiciallv estopped from
saving we didn’t know or we’re challenging it. They had an opportunity to

Right,

it, do Whatever they thought was necessary, but
Your Honor, they executed the RE-24 and then moved on
and consummated the sale. So it kind of takes away the “We didn’t know or that
we could get around it” argument. They absolutely knew. They absolutely knew it
was an easement 0f record and it was recorded and that they were taking the

challenge

it

at the time, renegotiate

rather than doing that,

property subj ect to
(TL, Vol.

I,

p. 32,

11.

6-17) (emphasis added).

analysis and held that the

(R., p. 278).

that.

Because

The

District

Court disagreed with the Fitzpatricks’

encumbrance over Lot 3 was void as a matter 0f law based 0n merger.

this issue

was

fully briefed t0, argued before,

and decided by, the

District

Court, and then subsequently properly appealed t0 this Court, the Fitzpatricks urge this Court to
disregard the Kents” argument t0 the contrary.

APPELLANT — CROSS RESPONDENT’S REPLY BRIEF, Page
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The

Fitzpatricks maintain their assertion that the

servitude, duly

West

encumbering Lot

Wood Investments

Easement Agreement

and the Kents are estopped from voiding

4,

it.

is

As

an equitable
this

Court in

held:

A purchaser is charged With everv fact shown bV the records and is presumed
t0

know everv other fact Which an examination suggested bv the records would

have disclosed. Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195-96, 30 P.3d 970, 973-74
(2001) (citing Cordova v. Hood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 1, 21 L.Ed. 587 (1872);
Northwestern Bank v. Freeman, 171 U.S. 620, 19 S.Ct. 36, 43 L.Ed. 307 (1898)).
“This Court has stated: ‘One who purchases or encumbrances with notice of
inconsistent claims does not take in 200d faith, and one who fails t0 investigate
the open and obvious inconsistent claim cannot take in 200d faith.”
Middlekauﬁ’l], 110 Idaho at 916, 719 P.2d at 1176 (quoting Langroise v. Becker,
96 Idaho 218, 220, 526 P.2d 178, 180 (1974)).
West Wood, 141 Idaho

at

The

84-85, 106 P.3d at 410-11 (emphasis added).

Fitzpatricks further

maintain that the actions of the Kents coincide With the facts 0f the Florida case, Hensel

417 So.2d 1035

(Fla. Dist. Ct.

Equitable estoppel, so far as

it

relates to the trial

setting

up

417 So.2d

at

to land, is a doctrine

by

he has through his

1038.

Agreement With the

had ample opportunity

Fitzpatricks.

Instead, the

commitment provided pursuant

to the

to challenge the validity

of the Easement

Kents executed the RE-24, did not question the

physical presence 0f the Vinyl fence surrounding the

t0

title

would be contrary t0 equity and good conscience.

In this case, the Kents

title

of

his legal title because

words, 0r silence led another to take a position in which the assertion of the

legal title

Id.,

Aurilio,

App. 1982), which held:

which a party is prevented from
acts,

v.

Pond Easement, nor did they challenge

RE-24. The Kents waived any right

the

to challenge title

Lot 4 When they failed t0 notify the Fitzpatricks pursuant t0 the RE-24 Which required:

“E

BUYER does not so object, BUYER shall be deemed to have accepted the conditions 0f the title.”
(R., p. 138)

(emphasis added). The Kents never raised an issue about the

condition of title to Lot

4.

title

commitment or the

Rather, the Kents closed the transaction, and they did so subj ect t0 the
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Easement Agreement. The Kents’ Warranty Deed
from

all

encumbrances except those

t0

set out that

Which this conveyance

made, suffered 0r done by the Grantee; and subiect
right(s)

When

is

expressly

made

subject and those

t0 all existing patent reservations, easements,

of way, protective covenants, zoning ordinances.”

time from December 15, 2016

they were taking the property “free

RE-24 and March

the Kents executed the

transaction closed, the Kents could have objected to the

(emphasis added). At any

(R., p. 173)

15,

2017 when the

Easement Agreement, but they did

The Kents always knew about the Easement Agreement,

it

not.

was duly recorded and ofrecord,

yet the Kents never objected t0 the encumbrance over Lot 4, thus, following the precedent set in

West
title

Wood Investments,

to

now challenging the

prior t0 purchasing Lot 4, the

merger, thus void ab

initio. (R., p.

282).

Easement Agreement was void based on the doctrine of

The Fitzpatricks submit that the District Court erred when

failed to recognize the equitable servitude

encumbering Lot

4.

The Merger Doctrine Does Not Applv

4.

The Fitzpatricks did not merge title to Lots
to this case.

The Kents

3

and 4, thus the merger doctrine does not apply

incorrectly assert that the legal authority cited

not apply because those were not necessarily easement cases. This
in Idaho,

even the District Court agreed with

Because Idaho courts have yet

this premise. (R., p.

to address this exact issue,

it

is

by

the Fitzpatricks should

an issue of ﬁrst impression

279; Tr., V01.

would make sense

decision.

v.

The

District

3

(R., pp.

Court relied on case law from other jurisdictions related to exceptions to the merger doctrine.

name

p. 13,

11.

9-16).

Court did in

its

279-28 1). The Fitzpatricks found multiple jurisdictions Which held that merger

Bd. ofTrS. ofSch. Dist. N0. 8 ofFlathead Cly., 812 P.2d 344, 347 (Mont. 1991); Hensel

1982), t0

II,

for the Fitzpatricks

t0 seek out opinions in other jurisdictions for guidance, just as the District

3

conditions of the

Lot 4. The District Court disagreed and noted that while the Kents knew about the Easement

Agreement

it

the Kents should be estopped from

v.

Aurilio,

a few. (R., pp. 280, 283).
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It

cited Wild RiverAdventures, Inc.

417 So. 2d 1035, 1037

(Fla. Dist. Ct.

App.

did not occur

by operation 0f law, but

rather, after certain requirements to

conﬁrm merger were

met, one 0f Which was the intent of the property owner.
Speciﬁcally, the United States

Supreme Court recently set

determining whether property merges by operation of law.
S.Ct. 1933 (2017).4

The

forth the factors necessary

Murr v.

Wisconsin, 582 U.S.

when

_, 137

test is:

must consider a number 0f factors. These include the treatment of the land
and local law; the physical characteristics of the land; and the
prospective value 0f the regulated land. The endeavor should determine whether
reasonable expectations about property ownership would lead a landowner t0
anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate
[C]ourts

under

state

tracts.

Id.,

137 S.Ct.

at

1945-46. Likewise, other jurisdictions d0 not conclude that merger happens

operation 0f law. Radnovich

v.

Nuzhat, 104

Wn. App.

800, 805, 16 P.3d 687 (2001); Stell

by

Jay

v.

Hales Dev. C0,, 11 Cal. App]

4th

A.2d 385 (1957); Cottone

Zoning Hearing Board ofPolk Township, 954 A.2d 1271, 1276

v.

1214 (Ca.

Ct.

App. 1992); Schwoyer

v.

Smith, 388 P. 637, 131

(Pa.Cleth. 2008).

The

Fitzpatricks urged the District Court to consider intent as a factor prior to

ﬁnding

that

Lots 3 and 4 merged by operation of law. The Fitzpatricks further argued t0 the District Court that
the local ordinances in the City of Eagle did not allow for merger

recorded covenants for Widgeon Lakes. (R.,

by operation of law, nor did

p. 187; R., pp. 184-85).

Finally, the Fitzpatricks

the

and

the District Court exchanged dialogue regarding the exceptions t0 the merger doctrine and

applicability of local

11.

4

5-25).

The Kents

Will address

and

state

laws during the hearing on summary judgment. (TL, Vol.

The conversation went

p. 20,

as follows:

0n Murr because it was not quoted in brieﬁng. The Fitzpatricks
more thoroughly in the section addressing the Kents’ Additional Issues

incorrectly assert that the Fitzpatricks cannot rely

why the Kents

I,

are incorrect in this assertion

on Appeal hereinbelow.
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THE COURT: So the specific circumstances you’re talking about, that you’re
framing as an exception to the rule that you can’t give yourself an easement, is any
time you own two separate parcels?
MS. PICKENS MANWEILER: Correct. That’s absolutely correct. In this case, you
can’t merge the two properties. They’re two separate and distinct subdivision lots.
Now, would we be having this argument if Mrs. Kent owned Parcel A and Mr. Kent
owned Parcel B as trustees, but just their names were different? I mean, that’s
essentially how narrow we’re coming down to this, “You can’t grant yourself an
easement.” I would submit to the Court that they’re still separate and distinct
parcels, Lot 3 and Lot 4. They were never merged. There was never an amendment
to the subdivision, and they were never literally considered unified in the title sense.
They’ve always been two separate and distinct lots since the original developer
separated them out, the City of Eagle stamped its approval, and it was duly recorded
with Ada County.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 20, ll. 5-25).
The District Court was not persuaded by the Fitzpatricks reliance on Radnovich, nor by the
Fitzpatricks reliance on state and local rules governing property. The District Court concluded that
Idaho does not recognize the intent exception to merger (R., p. 282) nor would the subdivision
ordinances govern whether or not merger occurred (R., p. 286). The Fitzpatricks submit that these
findings were made in error because Idaho appellate courts have not had an opportunity to decide
this issue, rather, this is an issue of first impression for this Court to decide.
The Kents further argue that the case law relied on by the Fitzpatricks should not be
persuasive to this Court because the cases were not easement cases. Even the District Court
recognized that any case dealing with title to real property would suffice for guidance on the issue
of merger, holding that, “Distinguishing among those terms, so as to determine which of them best
describes the Pond Easement, isn’t necessary because the merger doctrine applies to all three.” (R.,
p. 278). As the District Court noted, property law is property law, referencing the “bundle of sticks”
analogy, by citing to Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994). (R., p. 280). As stated in
Dolan, “the right to exclude others [is] one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
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are characterized as property. Dolan, 5 12 U.S. at

U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). Dolan

When

just like Murr.

operation of law, relevant to

a constitutional takings case decided

is

the U.S.

384 (quoting KaiserAetna

Supreme Court provides a

all

test to

United States, 444

by the U.S. Supreme

determine

“bundles 0f sticks” analogies, such

v.

if

Court,

merger happens by

test is quite

persuasive and

should be considered by this Court.

For these reasons, the Fitzpatricks urge
whether property, such as Lots 3 and
holding

common ownership to Lots

3

4,

this

Court t0 adopt the

test in

merge by operation of law. The

and 4 does not mean

that Lots 3

Murr

to determine

Fitzpatricks submit that

and 4 merged. The

District

Court failed t0 recognize these exceptions t0 the merger doctrine, and, as a result, the District Court
erroneously ruled that merger 0f title voided the Easement Agreement.

5.

The Kents had Record Notice 0f the Easement Agreement

At

all

times relevant to this case, the Kents had constructive and actual notice 0f the

encumbrances over Lot
meaning,

if a

document

The

is

including the Easement Agreement. Idaho

recorded against real property,

The Kents argue

that notice

Fitzpatricks disagree,

and so did

the recording.

10).

4,

30 P.3d 970, 973 (2001). This
of every matter affecting the

is

this

30 P.3d

at

973

(citing

subsequent purchasers take subj ect t0

Court in Kalange
title

v.

effect.

(Resp. Br., p.

Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195,

to lands is chargeable with notice

Which appears on the face of any recorded deed forming an

and

also with notice 0f such matters as

inquirv which the recitals in such instruments
at 195,

a notice recording state,

0f a void instrument has n0 legal

because “[0]ne claiming

estate,

essential link in his chain of title,

all

is

made

it

might be learned bv

a dutv t0 pursue.” Kalange, 136 Idaho

Glover v. Brown, 32 Idaho 426, 184 P. 649 (1919)) (emphasis added).

Furthermore, one cannot be a good faith purchaser when a reasonable investigation of the property

would have revealed

the existence of the conﬂicting claim in question. Langroise
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v.

Becker, 96

Idaho 218, 221, 526 P.2d 178, 181 (1974).
the property with sufﬁcient

knowledge

A person is not a bona ﬁde purchaser if he purchased

t0 put a reasonably prudent

Anderson, 142 Idaho 208, 213, 127 P.3d 111, 113 (2005).

who purchases
is

Adams

person 0n inquiry.

v.

Idaho courts have long held that “one

land expressly subj ect to an easement, 0r with notice, actual or constructive, that

burdened With an existing easement, takes the land subject

t0 the easement.” Checketts

it

v.

Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944).
In this case, there

was n0 dispute of

fact;

the Kents absolutely

had knowledge of the

Easement Agreement and the existence of the Pond Easement prior to purchasing Lot

Pond Easement was

fully fenced off

and incorporated

into

Lot

3.

The Kents offered n0

4.

The

facts

0n

summary judgment t0 refute this, nor have they ever argued they did n_0t know about the Easement
Agreement or existence of the Pond Easement. Following
Kents were put 0n notice 0f the

title

m

Idaho case law 0n point, once the

defect, the duty then shifted to the

validity 0r invalidity of the instrument.

Easement Agreement

all

The Kents

failed to take

closing, instead, they sat in silence

Kents t0 establish the

any action

t0 extinguish the

and simply disregarded the

recorded instrument hoping for the outcome they ultimately received, a favorable decision from
the District Court, invalidating the instrument. Accordingly, the Kents are not

bona ﬁde purchasers

taking Lot 4 free and clear 0f the Easement Agreement. Likewise, the District Court erred

it

When

voided the Easement Agreement rather than shifting the burden t0 the Kents to establish that

they were bona ﬁde purchasers for value.
6.

The
to the

The

Fitzpatricks

Have a Right to Maintain

Fitzpatricks have a right t0 maintain, repair,

Easement Agreement. The

Easement Agreement because

it

the Easement

and improve the Pond Easement pursuant

District Court did not address the Fitzpatricks’ rights

determined that the Easement Agreement was void ab
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under the

initio.

The

Kents did not dedicate any argument t0 the Fitzpatricks’ rights under the Easement Agreement
other than “issues regarding the scope of the Easement
this appeal.” (Resp. Br., p. 25).

this

The

Agreement

Fitzpatricks disagree. If the

are not the proper subject 0f

Easement Agreement

is

binding,

Court has the authority to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties beneﬁtting

from and burdened by the Easement Agreement. Scope

The Fitzpatricks submit that the

District

the rights 0f the Fitzpatricks are

is

always an issue in easement disputes.

Court erred by invalidating the Easement Agreement, thus

most deﬁnitely

at issue in this appeal.

Idaho courts have long held that an easement owner has the right to enter the servient estate
in order to maintain, repair or protect the easement.

Idaho 36, 41, 137 P.3d 423, 428 (2006). In

this case, the

the rights and obligations 0f the servient estate, Lot 4.

of Lot 3 the right t0 “maintain,

repair,

Ranch and Sheep

C0., 143

Easement Agreement actually

sets forth

Bedke

v.

Pickett

The Easement Agreement gives

the owners

The Kents

and improve the Easement Real Property.”

provided n0 genuine issues 0f material fact on summary judgment regarding the Fitzpatricks’
rights

under the Easement Agreement, thus the Easement Agreement,

The
the

District

if valid,

governs.

Court failed t0 address scope because 0f its ﬁnding regarding the validity of

Easement Agreement. This Court has the authority

t0 validate the

Easement Agreement and

determine the nature and scope 0f the Pond Easement, and the Fitzpatricks respectfully request
this

Court d0 just
7.

The

that.

The Kents Cannot Obstruct

the Fitzpatricks Use 0f the

Pond Easement

Fitzpatricks set forth the legal proposition that the Kents cannot obstruct the

Fitzpatricks use 0f the

Counterclaim

Pond Easement

(R., pp. 84-90),

The Kents did not address

and

in their

in their Cross

Complaint

Motion

for

(R., pp. 6-15), in their

Summary Judgment

Answer

to

(R., pp. 110-1 1).

the issue of obstruction in their Respondent Cross—Appellants’ Brief
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other than suggesting that obstruction of the
appeal.” (Resp. Br., p. 25).

Pond Easement was “not

The obstruction of the easement
and responsibilities related

this appeal. Just like the rights

whether or not a party can obstruct the use 0f an easement
there

is

is

most

the proper subject of this

certainly a proper subject t0

to the servient

always

and dominant

at issue. It

estate,

can be argued that

would never be an easement dispute unless someone was obstructing another’s use of an

alleged easement.

This case

is

n0

different.

Because the Easement Agreement

is

valid and

enforceable against Lot 4 and against the owners of Lot 4, the Kents cannot obstruct the
Fitzpatricks’

easement

Where

rights.

a servient landowner takes the land subject t0 the easement, he

interfering with the use

P.2d 914, 921

(Ct.

of the easement. Boydstun Beach Ass ’n

App. 1986).

An

easement owner

obstructed from exercising privileges granted

is

v.

refrain

from

Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 377, 723

entitled to relief upon a

by an easement.

must

Id.

showing

that

he

is

In this case, the Fitzpatricks

presented undisputed facts that the Kents were obstructing and interfering with the Fitzpatricks

use of the Pond Easement. There are simply n0 genuine issues of material fact that exist t0 prove
otherwise. Thus, since the District Court erred in voiding the Easement Agreement, the Kents have

been interfering with, and should be refrained from, any future interference with the Fitzpatricks’
easement
8.

rights.

The Kents Failed

In their

Motion

for

t0

Put Forth Disputed Facts on

Summary Judgment,

declarations, or evidence to support their

Summarv Judgment

the Kents failed to provide any afﬁdavits,

Motion

for

Summary Judgment with

the limited

exception 0f the Declaration of Alan Kent. The District Court did not agree that this proved fatal
to the Kents’

Motion

for

the Kents have put forth

Summary Judgment.

no genuine

Nevertheless, given the current record on appeal,

issues 0f material fact should this Court decide t0 validate the
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Easement Agreement. The Kents never challenged the allegations of their direct knowledge of the
Pond Easement, nor did the Kents ever dispute that the Fitzpatricks intended to create the Pond
Easement to preserve a right to use a portion of Lot 4. Further, the Kents did not provide facts to
rebut the fact that the Fitzpatricks never intended to merge title to Lot 3 and Lot 4. Finally, the
Kents failed to provide any factual evidence contrary to the Fitzpatricks’ assertions that they had
a right to use, maintain, repair, and improve the Pond Easement.
In summary, when this Court looks to the record to determine issues on the Cross Motions
for Summary Judgment, only the facts set forth by the Fitzpatricks should be considered because
nothing was produced by, nor argued by, the Kents to refute the same. The Kents cannot rest on
the pleadings alone, but rather, must set forth concrete factual issues through affidavits or
declarations. I.R.C.P. 56(c). Idaho courts have also held that in the absence of affidavits and
opposed only by an unverified answer, summary judgment motions are essentially uncontested.
Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 389, 797 P.2d 95, 97 (1990). With no evidence cognizable under
Rule 56(c) before the court, no facts are presented to raise a material issue of fact. Id. In ruling on
a motion for summary judgment, the court considers only material contained in the affidavits and
depositions which are based on personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial. Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate where a non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing to
establish the existence of an element essential to its case when it bears the burden of proof. Id.
Under the circumstances, this Court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be
drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Riverside Development Co. v. Richie, 103 Idaho
515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). In doing so, this Court can determine as a matter of law that
the Fitzpatricks have a valid and enforceable easement, that they have a right to use, maintain,
repair, and improve the Pond Easement, and, that the Kents are not allowed to obstruct the
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Fitzpatricks use of the

Pond Easement. The

Fitzpatricks urge this Court t0 determine, based

the Kents’ declarations (or lack thereof), that
the District Court’s erroneous decision

Judgment and denied the

fact exist,

which both granted the Kents’ Motion

Motion

Fitzpatricks’ Cross

VI.

1.

n0 genuine issues of material

for

and reverse

for

Summary

Summary Judgment.

ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL

Did the District Court err when it denied the Kents’ Motion for attornevs’
pursuant t0 Idaho Code 8 12-121?

The

on

District Court did not err

When

it

fees

denied the Kents’ Motion for Attorneys’ fees

pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. The District Court speciﬁcally found that the Fitzpatricks did
not pursue their claims frivolously 0r Without foundation.

A court should award fees pursuant to I.C.
belief that the action

foundation.”

C&

(T12,

§ 12-121

was pursued, defended, 0r brought

G, Inc.

v.

V01.

only

II,

when

p. 14,

is

not,

by

itself,

20-24).

“it is left

With the abiding

frivolously, unreasonably, or without

Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001).

the law, 0r 0f one’s interest under the law

11.

“A misperception of

unreasonable. Rather, the question

whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that

deemed

frivolous, unreasonable, 0r Without foundation.” Snipes

950 P.2d 262, 265 (Ct.App.1997).
granted if the court determines the
foundation.

Bremer LLC,

(emphasis added).

v.

“If there

w

An

v.

it

is

could be

Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893,

award 0f attorney fees under LC.

§ 12-121

of a party’s claim 0r defense

is

should only be

frivolous 0r lacking

East Greenacres, 155 Idaho 736, 745, 316 P.3d 652, 661 (2014)
is at least

one legitimate issue presented, attorney fees

awarded even though the losing party has asserted other
unreasonable, or Without foundation.”

may

not be

factual 0r legal claims that are frivolous,

Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho

99 (2010).
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282, 289, 246 P.3d 391, 398-

When the
§

12-121 in

discretion of Idaho Courts

Hoﬂer

The code now

statute regarding the

to I.C.

requirement that the action be completely

In any civil action, the judge

attorney’s fees t0 the prevailing party or parties

was brought, pursued or defended
§ 12-121.

award attorney fees pursuant

reads:

ATTORNEY’S FEES.

LC.

to

Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 380 P.3d 681 (2016), the Idaho legislature

v.

immediately passed a more deﬁnite
frivolous.

was expanded

In response to this

when

may award

the judge

ﬁnds

reasonable

that the case

frivolously, unreasonably or Without foundation.

amendment, the Idaho Supreme Court amended Idaho Rule 0f

Civil Procedure 54(6) as follows:

Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121. Pursuant

March
awarded by the
effective

1,

to the statutory

amendment

2017, attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121

when

may be

was brought, pursued 0r
unreasonably or Without foundation, Which ﬁnding must be

court only

it

ﬁnds

that the case

defended frivolously,
in writing and included in the basis and reasons for the award.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) (emphasis added).

When read together,
an award of attorney fees

if

Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(6) prevent
a party’s position in a case had any basis in law 0r

fact.

In this case,

the Fitzpatricks presented reasonable and well-founded arguments t0 the District Court. Simply

because the District Court determined that the Easement Agreement was invalid does not mean

were brought 0r defended

the claims

because the

Union

v.

district court

concludes

it

frivolously.

fails as

“A

claim

is

not necessarily frivolous simply

a matter of law.” GulfChem. Employees Fed. Credit

Williams, 107 Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984).

In this case, the District Court ruled, “I conclude that there

Plaintiffs’

p. 14,

to support

arguments in the case that the case was not brought frivolously, unreasonably, 0r

without foundation, so

II,

was enough

11.

20-24).

I

am

going t0 deny the request for attorney fees under 12-121.”

The Kents have not shown how

this

(Tr.,

Vol.

ﬁnding was an abuse 0f discretion. To
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the contrary, the District Court speciﬁcally found that the Fitzpatricks’ arguments

good

were made

in

faith as follows:

was an argument made in good faith that had foundation in the
decisions 0f some other court, some other jurisdiction, albeit apparently as a
minority—type rule, and it was addressed to an issue in which — the very narrow
issue in this case. There had not been an Idaho appellate decision exactly on point,
although there were numerous decisions that dealt With the merger doctrine and
ultimately provided ample support for the outcome.
So

(T12,

V01.

t0

me,

II,

p.

that

14,

11.

11-19).

By ﬁnding

that the Fitzpatricks

made

a

good

faith

argument

regarding an issue 0f ﬁrst impression in Idaho based 0n the application 0f law ofotherjurisdictions,
the District Court properly held that the provisions 0f Idaho

Code

§

12-121 were not met in this

case and the District Court properly denied the Kents’ request for attorneys” fees.

2.

Did the Fitzpatricks Raise

The Kents

raise, as

New Issues

an issue on appeal, the notion that the Fitzpatricks argued

0n appeal Which were not argued before the
v.

0n Appeal?

District Court.

While the Kents properly

new

cite

issues

Sanchez

Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 815 P.2d 1061 (1991) for the proposition that issues not raised with the

district court

should not be heard on appeal, the case

Supreme Court

in

is

inapplicable to this current case.

The Idaho

Sanchez held:

The longstanding

rule of this Court

is

that

we

Will not consider issues that are

presented for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal. E.g., Kinsela

v.

Dep ofFinance, 117
we applied the rule to

State,

’t

Idaho 632, 634, 790 P.2d 1388, 1390 (1990). Recently
dismiss the appeal in a case Where the state asked us to rule on an issue that was
not raised in the

The

trial court.

rationale for this rule

State

was

v.

Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991).

ﬁrst stated

by the Supreme Court 0f the

Territory 0f

Idaho in 1867:

It is

for the protection

t0 20 into court

of inferior courts.

and slumber,

as

It is

it

manifestlv unfair for a partv

were, 0n

[a]

defense, take n0

exception t0 the ruling, present n0 point for the attention 0f the court,

and seek to present [the] defense, that was never mooted before, t0 the
iudgment of the appellate court. Such a practice would destroy the
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purpose 0f an appeal and make the supreme court one for deciding questions

of law in the ﬁrst instance. Smith
In Johnson

v.

v.

Sterling,

1

Idaho 128, 131 (1867).

Diefendorf, 56 Idaho 620, 633, 57 P.2d 1068, 1073 (1936), the

Court refused to discuss or decide the validity 0f a statute 0n grounds that were not
pleaded or submitted t0 the trial court. In Oregon Shortline RR. v. City 0f

Chubbuck, 93 Idaho 815, 817, 474 P.2d 244, 246 (1970), the Court declined to
When the issues had not been raised
bv the pleadings nor argued or decided in the trial court.
decide Whether a statute was unconstitutional

Sanchez, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991) (emphasis added).
In this case, all issues that the Fitzpatricks argued in their

Appeal have already been raised

With the District Court. Just because the issues were not separately or individually stated causes

of action in the Fitzpatricks’ Complaint does not mean the issues were not part 0f the lawsuit.
Speciﬁcally, the Kents argue the following three items were not raised with the District Court and
as such, they should not

Wisconsin, and

(iii)

be addressed by

the scope 0f the

this Court: (i) equitable estoppel, (ii) reliance

Easement Agreement. (Resp.

on Murr v.

Br., p. 2).

Equitable Estoppel

i.

The Kents
supra, pp. 10-12.

Counterclaim,

incorrectly allege that the Fitzpatricks failed t0 allege 0r argue estoppel.

As

Fourth

disputed in detail, the Fitzpatricks pled estoppel in their

Afﬁrmative

Defense,

stating

“As

a

fourth

See

Answer

afﬁrmative

to

defense,

Counterdefendants allege that Counterclaimants are barred from recovery under the doctrine of
estoppel, waiver, laches, and unclean hands.” (R., p. 89) (emphasis added).

The Kents

further incorrectly assert that the Fitzpatricks are arguing “equitable estoppel”

in their Appellant’s Brief.

The Kents

are confusing the phrase

“The Kents

are estopped

from

nullifying the equitable servitude” (App. Br., p. 21) with application of the doctrine 0f equitable

estoppel.

The

Fitzpatricks have consistently argued that the Kents should be estopped

voiding the Easement Agreement because the Kents agreed and consented t0
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it,

from

this is quasi-

estoppel, not equitable estoppel. Idaho courts have distinguished

quasi-estoppel on numerous occasions. In Schiewe

this

v.

between equitable estoppel and

Farwell, 125 Idaho 46, 867 P.2d 920,

(1 993),

Court held:
Quasi-estoppel “precludes a party from asserting, t0 another’s disadvantage, a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken
it

would be unconscionable

t0 allow a

by

[them].

The doctrine

applies

Where

person t0 maintain a position inconsistent

with one in which [they] acquiesced, 0r of which [they] accepted a beneﬁt.” KTVB,
Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 281, 486 P.2d 992, 994 (1971). The doctrine of
quasi-estoppel is distinguishable from equitable estoppel in that “no concealment

0n the one side, nor ignorance 0r reliance on
Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 538, 567 P.2d
Hecla Mining C0. v. Star—Morning Mining C0., 122

0r misrepresentation 0f existing facts
the other,

is

a necessary ingredient.”

1284, 1289 (1977); see also

Idaho 778, 784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1992).
Id.,

125 Idaho

at 49,

867 P.2d

at

923. This Court has

more recently elaborated 0n quasi estoppel

as follows:

Quasi-estoppel applies when:
(1) the offending party

took a different position than his 0r her original

position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused

a disadvantage t0 the other party; (b) the other party was induced t0 change
it would be unconscionable t0 permit the offending party

positions; 0r (c)
to maintain

an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived

a beneﬁt 0r acquiesced

Atwood

v.

in.

Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006). “Quasi-estoppel

under Which a defendant Who can point to no
speciﬁc detrimental reliance due to plaintiffs’ conduct maV still assert that

is

essentially a last-gasp theory

estopped from asserting allegedlv contrarv positions where it
would be unconscionable for them t0 do so.” Schoonover v. Bonner Cnly., 113
Idaho 916, 919, 750 P.2d 95, 98 (1988).
plaintiffs are

Keybank Nat’l Ass’n

v.

PAL

I,

LLC, 155 Idaho 287, 294, 311 P.3d 299, 306 (2013) (emphasis

added).

While perhaps not the most

artfully drafted 0r skillfully articulated, the Fitzpatricks

consistently argued that the Kents should be estopped

is

void.

This

is

have

from asserting that the Easement Agreement

not an issue that was ﬁrst raised in the Fitzpatricks’ Appellant’s Brief.
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It

was

briefed at length in summary judgment motions and argued before the District Court in oral
argument. The Kents do correctly point out that the Fitzpatricks did not attempt to “establish the
elements of equitable estoppel” (Resp. Br., p. 18), and this is because the Fitzpatricks were not
attempting to do so. The Fitzpatricks have presented both undisputed facts and legal arguments
sufficient to establish that it would be unconscionable to permit the Kents to maintain an
inconsistent position from one that they have already derived a benefit from or acquiesced in. The
Fitzpatricks clearly raised the issue of quasi-estoppel before the District Court.
As stated, and reiterated multiple times, the Kents were informed about the Easement
Agreement in the MLS listing, by the listing agent, and in the RE-24. The Kents had ample
opportunity to challenge the validity of the Easement Agreement with the Fitzpatricks at that time.
Instead, the Kents executed the RE-24, did not question the physical presence of the vinyl fence
surrounding the Pond Easement, nor did they challenge the title commitment provided pursuant to
the RE-24. The Kents never raised an issue about the title commitment or the condition of title to
Lot 4 prior to closing as required by the RE-24. Rather, the Kents closed the transaction, and they
did so subject to the Easement Agreement.
West Wood Investments and Kalange provide guidance to this Court in applying the facts
of this case to the long-standing legal principles of Idaho law. The Fitzpatricks urge this Court to
rely on the premise that “one who purchases or encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims
does not take in good faith, and one who fails to investigate the open and obvious inconsistent
claim cannot take in good faith.” West Wood Investments, 141 Idaho at 85, 106 P.3d at 411.
Additionally, all buyers of real property are “chargeable with notice of every matter affecting the
estate, which appears on the face of any recorded deed forming an essential link in his chain of
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title,

and also with notice of such matters as might be learned by inquiry which the

instruments

made

it

knowledge when they contractually agreed

Agreement

t0

Easement Agreement, they had

the

be bound by the terms 0f the Easement

RE-24, thus they are estopped from taking a position contrary

in the

such

a duty t0 pursue.” Kalange, 136 Idaho at 195, 30 P.3d at 973.

The Kents not only had constructive knowledge of
actual

recitals in

t0 accepting the

Easement Agreement as part of their purchase of Lot 4. Accordingly, the Kents should be estopped
from attempting

to extinguish the equitable servitude, the

Easement Agreement, from the

Lot 4. This argument has been made consistently throughout the
Court and before

ii.

this Court,

and should be considered accordingly.

incorrectly assert that the Fitzpatricks should not be allowed to rely

Wisconsin because the Fitzpatricks did not

is

is

conﬁned

wholly without merit.
the exact

wording

It

begs the question, what

in one’s

0n Murr

cite t0 the case directly to the District Court.

brieﬁng below? While

Murr, they did argue the legal theories addressed in Murr in
at oral

both before the District

Murr v. Wisconsin

The Kents

argument

litigation,

is

v.

This

the point of an appeal brief if one

true, the Fitzpatricks

their

did not cite t0

summary judgment brieﬁng and

argument. See supra, pp. 13-15.

The

restrictions in

Sanchez only apply

nor argued 0r decided in the

trial court.

if

the issues had not been raised by the pleadings

Sanchez, 120 Idaho

the Fitzpatricks fully briefed and argued that there

at

322, 815 P.2d at 1062. In this case,

were two exceptions

t0 the

merger doctrine,

speciﬁcally (1) intent 0f the parties, and (2) state and local ordinances preclude merger
operation of law.

factors

to

title

Not

coincidentally, the United State

when determining whether

Court in

this case did

Supreme Court has

or not property merges

also held these are

by operation 0f law. While

not have the beneﬁt of the case cite t0 Murr,
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it

by

the District

did have the opportunity t0

recognize these two exceptions to the merger doctrine.

Idaho did not recognize such exceptions. Given this

Court should not decline to consider factors

It

is

set forth

simply declined t0 do

so, indicating that

an issue of ﬁrst impression in Idaho,

by

this

the highest court in the land simply

because the District Court was not apprised t0 the case. To refuse t0 consider these factors based

0n the language

in

Sanchez would be

antithetical to reaching a fair

and

ﬁllly

informed decision.

Accordingly, the Fitzpatricks respectfully request that this Court consider Murr When deciding this

new

issue in Idaho law.

Scope of the Easement Agreement

iii.

The Kents argue

this

Court should decline t0 decide any issues related to the scope of the

Easement Agreement based on their erroneous assertion that the issue was not posed to the
Court. (Resp. Br., p. 2).

always been an issue in

As

stated previously herein, the scope

this case

judgment. See supra, pp. 16-17.
the existence of an easement

easement,

i.e.

and was
It is

must

fully briefed

District

0f the Easement Agreement has

and argued t0 the

District Court at

summary

well settled under Idaho law that any judgment determining

also specify the character, Width, length,

the scope 0f the easement. Beckstead

v.

and location 0f the

Price, 146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876, (2008).

In this case, the Fitzpatricks sought a declaration from the District Court that they

right to use, maintain, repair,

District

and improve the Pond Easement.

(R., pp. 13-15).

Court declined to validate the Easement Agreement does not mean

determine the nature and scope of the Pond Easement

T0 adopt

if the

this

had a

Just because the

Court should not

Easement Agreement

is

indeed valid.

the Kents’ proposition, if a District Court disagrees with one’s argued position,

then one would not be entitled t0 reassert

it

0n appeal.

If this is the case,

what

is

the point of

appealing? The Fitzpatricks properly brought the issue of the scope 0f the Easement Agreement
before the District Court. This Court decides

summary judgment motions de nova,
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thus rendering

it

irrelevant that the District Court failed t0

make ﬁndings regarding scope of

the easement.

Accordingly, the Fitzpatricks request that this Court determine as a matter of law that the

Easement Agreement

Agreement

is

are binding

on the Kents.

are not entitled to attorneys’ fees

on the

attorneys’ fees

Fitzpatricks’ appeal.

award of costs and attorney fees
under I.A.R. 41

0n

their Cross—Appeal,

t0 the prevailing party.

if the appellate court is left

nor are they entitled t0

The Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 allow

for an

Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate

With an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought

0r defended frivolously, unreasonably, 0r without foundation. Durrant

70, 74,

Easement

ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL

VII.

The Kents

valid and enforceable and that the terms of scope within the

v.

Christensen, 117 Idaho

785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990).
In this case, the Fitzpatricks appealed the underlying decision 0f the District Court, but

given the standards under I.A.R. 41, the Fitzpatricks did not seek fees for their

initial

appeal.

Kents seek attorneys’ fees both 0n the underlying appeal and their cross—appeal. As ﬁllly
in the Fitzpatricks’ Appellant’s Brief,

attorneys’ fees

and also as

set forth herein, the

set forth

Kents are not entitled

t0

0n the underlying appeal. Further, because the District Court was correct in denying

the Kents’ request for attorneys” fees pursuant t0 long standing, and

that cases

The

now

statutory requirements,

must be pursued frivolously and Without any foundation, the Kents would not be the

prevailing party

0n

their cross—appeal.

Therefore, the Fitzpatricks respectfully request this Court

deny the Kents’ request for attorneys’ fees on the underlying appeal
Furthermore, the Fitzpatricks should be awarded their attorney fees
against the Kents’ cross-appeal because there

is

as well as their cross—appeal.

if

they prevail in defending

simply n0 basis in law or fact t0 support the

arguments made in the cross—appeal.
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VIII.

The

CONCLUSION

Fitzpatricks have established there are

Easement Agreement and the respective

rights

no genuine issues 0f

of the parties in

fact

With regard t0 the

this case. Additionally, this

Court

can determine the plain meaning of the Easement Agreement as a matter of law. Therefore, based

0n the forgoing, the Fitzpatricks respectfully ask

Memorandum

this

Court to reverse the District Court’s

Decision and conﬁrm the Fitzpatricks’ easement rights over and upon the Kents’

property.

At

the end 0f the day, courts are tasked With deciding equities in real property cases like

this matter.

When this

Court Views the actions of the Fitzpatricks,

to properly protect their rights in

issue of the validity of the

Lot

4,

versus the Kents

Pond Easement

who had

Who

did everything they could

every opportunity t0 raise the

prior to purchasing Lot 4, yet they failed t0

do

so, this

Court should determine that the equitable resolution would be t0 validate the Easement Agreement
for all of the reasons set forth herein

DATED: August 2,

and

in Appellant’s Brief.

2019.

PICKENS LAW,

P.A.

By

Pickens Manweiler

/s/ Terri

Terri Pickens Manweiler,

Of the Firm

Attorneysfor Plaintijfv-CounterdefendantsAppellants
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Boise, ID 83701

Pickens Manweiler
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/s/ Terri

Terri Pickens
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